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INTRODUCTION
Prime Minister Nehru, a Kashmiri Hindu Pandit, once said that “the people of the Indian
subcontinent, despite a variety of languages, castes, and races, shared an overarching historical
and cultural experience and had common racial roots in the different regions that made them all
uniquely Indian. Where religion may separate them, language, race and culture also united them”
(Thomas, 2004). This was true for much of India’s history as an independent nation, despite
regular outbreaks of communal tension. However, Kashmir’s identity crisis began before The
last maharaja (ruler) of Kashmir, Hari Singh, spent millions of rupees on his coronation and also
placed “outsiders” in his government (Schofield, 2003). The Kashmiri Pandits led a campaign
called “Kashmiris for Kashmir”, which led to the Hereditary State Subject Law, forbidding the
employment of non-state subjects in public services and purchase of land (Schofield, 2003).
After this law was passed, Kashmiri Pandits and people from Jammu were recruited for such
government positions, angering the Muslim Kashmiris (Schofield, 2003). Additionally, Kashmiri
Muslims were not permitted to own firearms or be in the military (Schofield, 2003). Despite the
differences between the Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims, they were still able to find common
ground and fight the autocratic rule of Hari Singh’s autocracy (Schofield, 2003). Today, the
Pandits and Muslims have been conditioned to be hostile towards the other, but this has not
always been the case. Despite the alliance between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the past,
Kashmiri Muslims today find it difficult to feel a connection to the rest of the country and their
own state as the only Muslim majority state in the nation. Muslim Kashmiris are not only
separated by religion, but also language and culture, as they identify more with Pakistan’s
history. In 1949, the maharaja (ruler) of Jammu and Kashmir had several choices: accede to
India, accede to Pakistan, or pursue independent statehood. He chose to accede to India in
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exchange for military assistance in a skirmish between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir,
However, he did so under the condition that the state would receive special status with the
creation of Article 370 of the Constitution. This article allows for “the state to have its own
constitution, a separate flag and independence over all matters except foreign affairs, defence
[sic], and communications” (BBC News, 2019). In sum, the appeal of this agreement would be
that Kashmir could maintain local autonomy while also receiving support from the Indian
government. Kashmir is also geographically separated from India by a valley, and the rest of the
state, Jammu, by some of the tallest mountains in the world. Socially and physically isolated
from the rest of the country, it is clear that the treatment of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is
markedly different from the rest of the state, demonstrated by the lack of fair and free elections
and democratic processes that other states are granted within India.
This paper will explore the ethnic mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims against the state of
India, with the assistance of Pakistan, the reasons behind ethnic mobilization, and the insurgency
that ensues as a result of the oppression Kashmir had faced. Using varying hypotheses from
scholars in the field of ethnic relations, we refute the idea that ethnicity causes civil war and
explore other potential factors for conflict and instead view geography and political mobilization
as key factors of conflict. My hypothesis is that ethnicity is not politically salient until it is
mobilized by an outside actor, particularly one within close proximity to the ethnic group. We
will use the case study of Kashmir to apply to this hypothesis.
METHODOLOGY
This paper aims to address the role that ethnicity has in conflict. I postulate that ethnicity is not
formed on its own and that it takes an outside actor, particularly a political entrepreneur, to
mobilize a group to recognize their identity as an ethnicity. It is especially important that we

3

consider the proximity of the political entrepreneur to the ethnic group in question; for example,
the role that Pakistan played in Kashmir’s ethnic mobilization. Pakistan shares a border and
common religion (Islam) with Kashmir, creating a physical sense of closeness as well as a deeper
bond through religion. I refute the primordialist viewpoint that is common in past literature,
which refers to the idea that ethnicity is not created and remains stagnant. I argue from a
constructivist viewpoint that ethnicity is created through motivations by outside actors to gain
political power. More specifically, I argue that geographic location also plays a role in ethnic
mobilization.
I use James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin’s hypotheses from “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and
Civil War” to compare the factors that they believe play a role in the relationship between
ethnicity and conflict to the case of Kashmir. Through this qualitative approach, I analyzed
several of their hypotheses that were most relevant to my analysis of Kashmir: 1) “measures of a
country’s ethnicity or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war”; 2)
“countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at a greater risk for civil
war”; 3) “the presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by roads at a distance from the centers
of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign,
cross-border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the
insurgents to government agents”; and 4) “the political and military technology of insurgency
will be favored, and thus civil war made more likely, when potential rebels face or have
available the following”: a newly independent state, political instability, a mic of democracy and
autocracy, a large country population, and foreign government support. (Fearon and Laitin,
2003). Their paper serves as a platform for my own research as they are two of the leading
scholars in the field and have done extensive work on the relationship between ethnicity and
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conflict. I will use their hypotheses and other research throughout this paper to form my case
study on Kashmir.
Using the two main theoretical lenses of ethnicity, the primordialist and constructivist
views, I contest the legitimacy of the primordialist argument and instead promote the
constructivist view as most important in understanding ethnic relations. Primordialism operates
under the idea that ethnicity simply exists and conflict is bound to happen as a result of inherent
differences. The constructivist view, on the other hand, views ethnicity as an identity that is
mobilized for a specific reason and can change over time based on events and experiences the
group faces. However, understanding both the primordialist and constructivist view is crucial in
understanding ethnic relations as the former explains the prevailing theories of the past that
attempted to understand ethnicity, and the latter helps us to understand the complexity of
ethnicity that previously went unnoticed.
I chose the case study of Kashmir because it has been involved in conflict for its entire
existence, yet people are just starting to pay attention to it today. Identifying the root cause of the
problem in Kashmir, which has a majority Muslim population and a minority Hindu (Kashmiri
Pandit), while this is reversed for the entire country of India. Because the current Indian
government is run by the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) that operates on a “Hindu-first” agenda, it
is easy to follow primordialist thinking and believe that the issues stem from ethnic and religious
differences. Rather than take the conflict for what it is on the surface, I chose to study the history
of Kashmir, the terse and contentious relationship between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and
the ethnic mobilization of the Kashmiri Muslims. By starting with the beginning and working up
towards today’s conflict in Kashmir, we use a constructivist lens to evaluate the salience of
ethnicity over time.
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The main limitation in this study is the continuing development of the situation in
Kashmir. Every day, there is new information regarding updates on Indian occupancy of
Kashmir and it is impossible to predict what may come next. Though we may not have the full
timeline of events yet, analyzing the information we have now provides us with another useful
case study that explains the salience of ethnic mobilization in present day India and Kashmir. In
the following theory section, we will discuss definitions of key terms as well as previously used
case studies to analyze ethnic mobilization.
THEORY
A political party by definition is a group of people that organize themselves to gain
power, and when the party is formed on the basis of identity, specifically ethnicity, the party’s
interests will be more focused on gain for the ethnic group (Duverger, 1959). Ethnicity is a form
of identity that is rooted in historical, cultural, and geographical relations which include
attributes that can be
acquired genetically (e.g. skin color, hair type, eye color, height, and physical
features), through cultural and historical inheritance (e.g. name, language, place
of birth, and origins of one’s parents and ancestors) or in the course of one’s
lifetime as markers of such an inheritance (e.g. last name or tribal markings)
(Seymour and Cunningham, 2016).
An ethnic party, then, limits its reach to its own ethnic constituency and does “not pursue
universalistic programs but rather seeks to secure material and political benefits for the ethnic
group” (Seymour and Cunningham Gallagher, 2016).
Almost every nation in the world identifies as ethnically heterogenous, with the exception
of Japan, Korea, and several Scandinavian countries, yet there are few cases where heterogeneity
leads to violence. James D. Fearon makes the distinction between ethnicity being socially
relevant and being politically mobilized. When ethnicity is socially relevant, ethnic distinctions
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condition people’s actions in their daily life; but when ethnicity is politicized, access to political
benefits is dependent on one’s ethnicity (Fearon, 2004). Fearon’s definitions of social relevance
and political mobilization can partially help us to understand why conflicts may arise between
ethnic groups, but not why ethnic groups are mobilized in the first place.
Under certain circumstances, ethnicity becomes politically mobilized for several reasons,
but one of the more common theories is for economic reasons, which can be divided into two
sub-categories: grievances and greed. Economic grievance is the idea that “economic disparity,
as captured by differential rates of poverty between any two ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic
groups of people, would directly result in conflicts over resources” (Ishiyama 2009). When there
are clear disparities between two identity groups, communal conflict is more likely to break out
amongst the two groups. Economic greed, on the other hand, is the theory touted by Paul Collier,
James Fearon, and David Laitin that
the availability of resources provides an incentive for “greed” that in turn
provides incentives to engage in conflict…a most important risk factor is that
countries that have a substantial share of their income (Gross Domestic Product
[GDP]) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at
risk of conflict (Ishiyama, 2009).
The other argument that many ethnicity scholars make is that political entrepreneurs capitalize
on the wants and needs of one ethnic group, mobilize the group into a voting bloc, and pursue
their interests to gain traction as a party. In order to mobilize an ethnic group, the political
entrepreneur must ensure that the ethnic group is 1) large enough to be politically salient and 2)
that the group strongly aligns themselves with their ethnic background (Posner, 2003). If the
group does not have many identifying members, they will be politically irrelevant within the
government and will not be able to gain enough traction to be successful. Another possibility is
that while the group may have a lot of identifying members, their ethnicity may not be as
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important to them as other aspects of politics or their identity. Without both components present
in a politically mobilized ethnic group, the party will be inconsequential. To distinguish between
social relevance and political mobilization, Posner provides examples from a case study in
Zambia and Malawi.
To provide a comparison of socially relevant and politically mobilized ethnic groups,
consider the case of the Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and in Zambia. Posner explains the
difference between the groups in each nation: in Zambia, the Chewas and Tumbukas are
mobilized under the political bloc of “Easterners”, allowing the two ethnic groups to work
together towards common goals. In Malawi, ethnic groups are mobilized and seen as distinctly
different from the others, whereas the Chewas and Tumbukas have no perceivable discrimination
or hostility towards the other in Zambia. While the two major ethnic groups in Zambia are not
politically mobilized, the two groups are still socially relevant. Zambians have a greater sense of
nationality than they do ethnic identity which is because the government prioritized creating a
neutral language and identity, but still allowed for other languages and cultures to be accepted
outside of politics. Unlike Zambian Chewas and Tumbukas, Malawian Chewas and Tumbukas
recognize the other group as distinctively different, and they acknowledge that there are ethnic
markers that distinguish them from one another.
When people feel that their identity is being threatened by another group, they may try to
mask the traits that distinguish them from others to protect themselves. However, ethnic identity
can be a difficult thing to disguise, considering some ethnic markers are physical. Ethnic
markers, according to Seymour and Cunningham, serve two purposes:
the stronger the ethnic markers that distinguish members of a group from its rival,
the more easily members of one group can be singled out for discriminatory
treatment by the members of the rival group; and second, the stronger those
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markers, the less likely are assimilation and the more likely conflict between the
groups (Seymour and Gallagher Cunningham, 2016).
Because ethnicity can have physically distinguishable differences from others, ethnic groups can
be differentiated more easily from one another than any other identity group.
Decisions are made based on the perceived power their group has; for example, if a
majority ethnic group feels that they are threatened by immigration, they will identify with a
nationalist view to protect their ethnic interests. However, if a minority ethnic group feels
threatened by a majority ethnic group, they may choose to hide that part of themselves to avoid
persecution. In politics, people use these identities to guide their voting decisions. Identity
politics is defined as people that vote in the interest of what their strongest identity is, whether
that be race, class, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, gender, or any other number of
things. When choosing a candidate, people who have a strong sense of identity will opt to elect a
candidate who will protect their interests. Aligning one’s vote with the candidate who represents
them, either in appearance, background, or just as a mindful representative, is not typically an
issue. However, when the identity of the group is based on animosity towards another group,
tensions will rise between the groups.
Parekh, the author who defines multiculturalism, states that “the sense of belonging
cannot be ethnic and based on a shared cultural, ethnic, and other characteristics… but must be
political and based on a shared commitment to the political community” (Parekh, 2000). In
Parekh’s analysis of multiculturalism, he shares a similar rhetoric to Fearon’s distinction
between social relevance and political mobilization: ethnic groups can be socially relevant, but
should also share a common commitment to the success of the country’s development (2000).
However, when the ethnic group(s) become politically mobilized, that is when intentions become
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more malicious and competitive. When ethnic groups form political blocs, the ethnic groups will
vie to gain power and economic gain.
A potential reason that one political party may want to stoke tensions with another group
is to generally gain dominance over another group in a form of revenge. In the case of the Hutu
and Tutsis, the Tutsis were the ethnic group placed in power by the Belgian and later French
colonists with no representation of the Hutus. The Hutus then mobilized and exiled thousands of
Tutsis, made another Hutu president, and were responsible for the killing of twenty thousand
Tutsis. The Hutu president was then ousted and replaced with a Tutsi president, and the roles of
the two groups changed: the Hutu were then forced into exile, fleeing to Burundi to avoid
violence, and were the group victimized by a genocide at the hands of the Tutsis. This conflict
stemmed from the power struggle between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda and the desire for
one to have power over the other. Another potential explanation for stoking tensions between
groups is to gain political power as a party. For example, a nationalist-based party may tout antiimmigration and racist policies that discriminate against a minority group in the state. When the
party appeals to an ethnic majority, they are able to mobilize a large percentage of the population
and take advantage of some of the beliefs that an ethnic group may hold. In times of economic or
political turmoil, politicians and voters alike look to a group, usually a weaker or smaller one, as
the cause of their problems. These groups are referred to as scapegoats, which is when blame is
placed on a group that has nothing to do with the problems that the state is facing. Even if the
ethnic majority is not necessarily anti-(minority), placing the blame on another group is an easier
solution that admitting fault in one’s own party. Additionally, being the party in power has its
benefits: the ethnic majority will likely experience policies that will advance their group, while
the ethnic minority will experience policies that will slow their progress. The gap between the
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ethnic majority and minority will grow further, ensuring the ethnic majority will be successful
through promotion of policies in their best interests and the repression of the ethnic minority. By
scapegoating an ethnic minority, the state can justify “punishing” them for the problems of the
state.
Creating different groups leads to an advantage to the ethnic majority over time, as well
as the party: when they vote for the party that provides a benefit for their group, they are more
likely to re-elect the party that is on their side. If the ethnic majority had not been previously
politically mobilized, it is more likely that they had been indifferent towards the ethnic minority,
but have since changed their opinions based on the influence by their party. The majority may
hold animosity towards the ethnic group itself, or at least does not want them to take power in
the state because it will no longer be beneficial to the ethnic majority and can potentially be
detrimental. This is similar to the situation we have seen since Indian independence up until
today between India, Pakistan, and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the literature review, we
will take a deeper dive into the nuances of the primordialist and constructivist theoretical lenses,
as well as review scholarly literature on ethnicity, mobilization, and conflict.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since India’s independence from the British Empire, the state known as Jammu and
Kashmir located in northwestern India has been a contested area. Both Pakistan and India fully
claim the state as their own due to disputed geographical borders, but also because Pakistan is a
Muslim-majority country as is Jammu and Kashmir. Though both countries fully believe the
territory is theirs, Pakistan and India rule only parts of the state. This is just one case of many
regarding governments using a hotly-contested area as a political pawn. Kashmir has acted as an
arena in which political entrepreneurs have used and manipulated ethnic and religious identities,
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for their own gain. By using ethnic identities in politics, political agents are able to exacerbate
underlying resentments, anxieties and aspirations in order to enhance their own legitimacy and
power, building their own base of support through persecution of another ethnic group.
Identity is what defines a person and how they act. When someone asks, “tell me about
yourself”, you are likely to answer with something related to your occupation, familial role,
ethnic group, or anything else that you feel is relevant to the person you are. Identity, as it is
defined by Seymour and Gallagher Cunningham, is “a social category denoting some
fundamental and consequential sameness in which an individual is eligible to be a member”, or
similarly, can be seen as a “‘social radar’ that provides individuals with a point of reference,
allowing them to situate themselves within a wider group and understand how their membership
affects them in the social world” (2016). In sum, the way people define and align themselves
with others is how they find meaning and purpose in life. Having an identity that connects you
with others gives you a support system and a sense of family that people who do not have
common identities cannot provide. Specifically, ethnic identity is of special importance to the
study of politics because it can shape a political party.
The study of ethnicity, mobilization, and violence is one that cannot be defined by just
one theoretical lens (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). For this reason, scholars of the subjects tend to
utilize multiple fields of study, such as psychology and sociology, as well as apply multiple
international relations theories (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). At the basis of all arguments
regarding ethnic violence are two main views, primordialism and constructivism. Primordialist
proponents believe that ethnicity does not change and is distinguishable by certain characteristics
(Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Perhaps the most important factor in the primordialist belief is that
because ethnicity is fixed, ethnic tension and violence are unavoidable; however, this point of
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view has been much disputed by the opposing viewpoint (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). While it is
important to understand the roots of ethnicity and whether it is fluid or fixed, it is equally as
important to note how ethnicity becomes relevant, especially in regards to politics.
Constructivism, on the other hand, does not believe that there are certain characteristics of
ethnicity and that ethnicity is in fact more fluid than the primordialists believe (Fearon and
Laitin, 2000). In understanding ethnicity in these two general frameworks, the literature aims to
address the reasons and the structures behind ethnic tension and violence, and why ethnicity is
significant in the first place.
The ongoing discussion over primordialism versus constructivism likely will not end anytime
soon. Understanding both arguments is crucial for analyzing different case studies of ethnic
violence, though much of the literature today touts a constructivist point of view. Ethnicity,
mobilization, and political entrepreneurship create a framework so that we can better understand
ethnic relations and the reasons for conflict. Using the information in this study, I apply these
key terms and ideas as outlined above to the case of Kashmir, past and present. As the Kashmir
situation unfolds, it is impossible to know what the outcome of the conflict will be, but by
utilizing a constructivist theoretical lens, we can better understand the past and present
implications of ethnic mobilization and political entrepreneurs.
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION THEORIES
Ethnicity becomes salient to politics and conflict when it is mobilized by a feature of
identity, economic or political motivations, discourse, or by a political actor (Olzak, 1983). Three
major scholars, sociologist Susan Olzak and political scientists David D. Laitin and James D.
Fearon describe two different sets of theories regarding ethnic mobilization. Olzak gives a broad
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overview of the primordialist and constructivist view and does not necessarily pick a stance,
while Fearon and Laitin are constructivists.
Olzak, who defines ethnic mobilization as a “collective action that takes some set of
ethnic markers as criteria for membership”, also lists several other potential measures of ethnic
mobilization as well (1983). The listed measures are areas of mobilization that have been
previously researched by other scholars, including collective ethnic behavior, ethnic separatist
party vote, studies of ethnic conflict, war, and genocide, amongst others (Olzak, 1983).
Following the constructivist perspective described above, Fearon and Laitin argue that ethnic
mobilization does not inevitably emerge due to primordial differences but is produced through
social and economic processes as agents of construction, social construction by discourse, and
individuals as agents of construction (2000). The social and economic processes that create
ethnic identity and lead to ethnic mobilization are related to economic modernization. As one
author cited in the text states, national identity was shaped “as an almost accidental by-product of
“print capitalism”” (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The second argument for social construction of
ethnicity that Fearon and Laitin make is that when one ethnic group is identified, it “others” the
opposing group, which can lead to tension. “Othering” refers to the idea that differentiating
oneself or one’s group from the rest of society isolates the group as a singular force, rather than a
part of the community. The “other” in this case is likely to be viewed more negatively due to the
discourse surrounding the group (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The final argument for social
construction Fearon and Laitin make consists of two parts: strategic action by elites, and strategic
action on the ground. Strategic action by elites refers to producing ethnic violence through the
creation of antagonistic identities to further their own political pursuits (Fearon and Laitin,
2000). This is achieved through recruitment, “the explicit request by political elites for

14

individuals to perform some political act” (Abramson and Claggett, 2001). Political elites will
only mobilize individuals if it is both beneficial and strategic for their purpose (Abramson and
Claggett, 2001). Though in Abramson and Claggett’s piece they use political mobilization to
explain voting behavior and other less nefarious actions, recruitment and mobilization can also
be used to explain ethnic mobilization and the potential conflict that comes with it. These
political elites, or entrepreneurs, are a crucial aspect of ethnicity and conflict, as they may use
these strategies to anger members of another group or nation, provoking them into a larger-scale
war. Strategic action on the ground refers to the slow development of ethnic identity based on
repetitive actions by individuals (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Over time, the actions of a specific
group of people on a day-to-day basis make up an ethnic group due to their shared similar
practices. While Fearon and Laitin approach ethnic mobilization from a strictly political lens,
Olzak approaches the same idea with a sociological framework, largely focusing on economic
reasons for mobilization.
Olzak describes in her paper the four major theoretical frameworks of ethnic
mobilization: developmental theories, internal colonialism and cultural division of labor models,
economic models of ethnicity, and competitive models. The developmental model theory is
explained as ethnicity becoming relevant again as a country develops and is a likely outcome
when the following factors are present: the equal size of ethnic populations residing within a
state, relatively advanced periphery when compared to ethnically different regions, lack of class
cleavages and therefore lack of class-based parties, history of peripheral region government, and
a strong sense of nationalism of one ethnic group producing a corresponding ethnic reaction from
another group (Olzak, 1983). The internal colonialism model “attempts to explain ethnic
regionalism (and regional resistance to ethnic assimilation) by applying to within-state settings

15

the core periphery model found in world-systems theory” (Olzak, 1983). Building off of this
point, when cultural differences collide with differences in development, “cultural and
economically exploitations are mutually reinforcing” (Olzak, 1983). The cultural division of
labor comes into play when a labor market is segregated by ethnic and cultural boundaries
(Olzak, 1983). While ethnicity may vary, workers may have similar economic goals and will
mobilize based on class instead and by reducing the cultural division of labor “[class solidarity]
can hypothetically produce a decline in ethnicity” (Olzak, 1983).
The third theory regarding ethnic mobilization is the economic model, which assumes
that “economic roles determine the degree to which ethnic solidarity exists” (Olzak, 1983). This
theory is divided into two separate arguments: the split labor market theory and the segregated
labor market theory. The split labor market theory postulates that ethnic conflict will peak when
at least two ethnic groups are competing within the same labor market and request different
wages (Olzak, 1983). Ethnically divided labor groups can lead to ethnic antagonism, which lists
racism, lynching, and discrimination, amongst other factors, as examples (Olzak, 1983).
Segregated labor market theory seeks to explain “the persistence of ethnic boundaries by
emphasizing the role of specialized economic institutions and network relations in maintaining
ethnic solidarity” (Olzak, 1983). Though this theory does not fully explain how ethnic solidarity
can impact ethnic mobilization, there is some research that may show a linkage between the two.
For example, in some studies, it has been shown that the decline of ethnic solidarity may be
associated with large-scale ethnic mobilization (Olzak, 1983).
The final theory that Olzak presents is the competitive model of ethnic mobilization. This
theory purports that “as ethnic groups come to compete in the same labor markets and increase
their access to similar sets of political, economic, and social resources, ethnic mobilization will
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occur” (Olzak, 1983). The competitive model takes a constructivist approach as race and
ethnicity are defined by “socially attributed” characteristics, considering both behavioral and
physical aspects (Olzak, 1983). This model incorporates modernization into its consideration of
ethnic mobilization because as an economy and state modernize, they encourage groups to
mobilize along larger lines, “rather than along kinship, village, or some other smaller-scale
boundary” (Olzak, 1983). Such large-scale mobilization naturally points to ethnicity as a
possibility for mobilization. Therefore, “the competitive theories explain the causal link between
modernization and ethnic mobilization both in terms of rising levels of ethnic competition and in
terms of increasing legitimacy of subnational and territorial ethnic movements” (Olzak, 1983).
Though economic and political modernization does not encourage ethnic mobilization, the
indirect support may be enough to spur it, which could potentially lead to ethnic violence. In the
second half of this literature review, we will discuss the potential reasons for violence and
insurgency and how ethnicity plays a role.
CIVIL WAR, INSURGENCIES, AND VIOLENCE
To understand what is causing civil war, violence, and insurgencies, the reader must
know what we mean by each term. Ethnic violence is defined by Brubaker and Laitin as:
violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state
(or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is
coded – by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts – as having
been integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence is
coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way to the different ethnicity
of the target (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998).
In sum, ethnic violence can best be described as violence that is motivated by ethnic differences
and across ethnic lines. There are three main forms of large-scale ethnic violence: (1) communal
or societal ethnic violence, which refers to ethnic riots, pogroms, feuds, and hate crimes; (2)
state-led aggression, which includes state-led pogroms, police brutality, oppression by state
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agents, and state-led/assisted genocides; (3) separatism, which is defined as “where the latter
seeks greater political autonomy or secession from the state”; and (4), contests or state
breakdowns, which refers to “violence between ethnic groups seeking control (or increased
control) of a recognized state apparatus”. Such acts of separatist violence are “associated with
attempts to secede to establish a separate state, or to join another existing state” (Brubaker and
Laitin, 1998). Understanding the differences between types of ethnic violence can help
distinguish the reasons as to why the violence occurred. The first and second type of violence is
based in hatred towards another ethnic group, and those in power either attempt to oppress or kill
the weaker group. The third type of violence, however, occurs as a result of oppression and is an
extreme form of retaliation against the oppressor. The fourth type of violence is a mixture of
ethnic hatred and a desire to rule the state, seen in cases such as Rwanda. Consistent ethnic
violence is often present in the form of an insurgency or civil war, as seen in the third and fourth
type of violence.
Insurgencies
According to Brubaker and Laitin, insurgencies can best be understood by the conditions
that support insurgencies. These conditions are “largely independent of cultural differences
between groups and even group grievances” (Fearon and Laitin, 1999). The most important thing
to know about insurgencies is that they are weak in comparison to the governments they fight;
however, they are effective because they are able to hide. One hypothesis touted by Brubaker
and Laitin on the success of insurgents is “the presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by
roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So
should the availability of (b) foreign, cross-border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can
be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agencies” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It
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is also thought that insurgents must have grievances in regards to some form of discrimination
along the lines of cultural differences as a form of motivation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
Insurgents are more likely to survive and succeed in their mission when the government is
relatively weak, defined by factors such as poor finances and organization, corruption, political
divide, and a large population contributing to lack of information about local politics (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). Though insurgencies and civil wars have similarities in their practices and
intentions, they differ in their organizational structure and criteria for being described as either
an insurgency or a civil war.
Civil Wars
Fearon and Laitin use the following criteria to define a civil war:
(1) they involved fighting between agents (or claimants to) a state and organized,
nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take
power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The
conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of at
least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians
attacked by rebels) (2003).
The characteristics of a civil war differ from those of an insurgency as the latter is defined as “a
technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla
warfare from rural bases” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Insurgencies are also characterized by
indiscriminate and brutal killings, rather than being defined by a finite number of deaths like
civil wars. Understanding the difference between civil war and insurgencies, we then explore the
potential causes of both forms of violence.
Across many disciplines of research, it has been stated as a fact that ethnically diverse
societies are more prone to civil war, but according to a dataset analyzed by Fearon and Laitin
(2003), this statement is false (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The dataset in question includes 161
countries that had a population of at least 500,000 in 1990 and covers the period of 1945 to 1999
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(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While it may seem logical that a state with ethnic grievances is more
likely to have a civil war, this is also refuted with quantitative data by Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Though grievances, along with ethnic hostilities and nationalist sentiments often motivate rebels,
these categories are too broad to mark where civil war breaks out (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). To
establish the possible influences on civil war, Fearon and Laitin provide several hypotheses to
help explain potential reasons for the violence. Regarding the influences behind civil war, Fearon
and Laitin establish seven hypotheses:
(1) Measures of a country’s ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with
a higher risk of civil war; (2) the effect of ethnic diversity on the probability
of civil war should increase at higher levels of per capita income;(3) Countries
with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at a greater risk
for civil war; (4) measures of political democracy and civil liberties should be
associated with lower risks of civil war onset; (5) policies that discriminate in
favor of a particular language or religion should raise the risk of civil war
onset in states with religious or linguistic minorities; (6) greater income
inequality should be associated with higher risks of civil war onset; and (7)
among countries with an ethnic minority comprising at least 5% of the
population, greater ethnic diversity should associate with a higher risk of
ethnic civil war (2003).
In regards to the first three hypotheses, Fearon and Laitin attempt to find out if there is a
relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict, like much of the popular literature on ethnic
conflict claims. They find through the data used that “the estimates for the effect of ethnic and
religious fractionalization are substantively and statistically insignificant”; when analyzing the
poorest countries with the highest rates of civil war, more homogenous countries were more
civil-war prone than less homogenous countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Hypothesis four is
also disproven by the data as the coefficient for democracy was both positive and statistically
insignificant, indicating that “civil war onsets are no less frequent in democraciesafter
controlling for income” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). After testing for linguistic or religious
discrimination (hypothesis five), the authors find no result as discrimination is not associated
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with higher risks of civil war onset. Hypothesis six, income inequality, is disproved by the Gini
coefficient estimates of income inequality as they are not statistically significant (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). Finally, the authors find that hypothesis seven, similar to hypotheses one through
three, is also not supported by the data. Using the measures of religious diversity, they find weak
and inconsistent results, and “support for H7 diminishes further if we code the “partially” or
“ambiguously” ethnic wars as nonethnic” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Fearon and Laitin do not
find that any of the typical predictive factors of civil war statistically impact the onset and
conclude that the prevalence of civil war in the late 20th century is a result of newly decolonized,
weak, and impoverished states that are more prone to civil violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
Though this piece came out seventeen years ago, mass media still touts the primordialist idea that
war and conflict are inevitable in ethnically heterogenous societies. Through an exploration of
Fearon and Laitin’s work through on the topic, one would see that there is no relationship
between ethnicity and war.
We now move into the general history of Jammu and Kashmir to understand the context
of the case study that follows.
HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
Prior to Indian independence, the British empire ruled the nation and its surrounding
areas (now Bangladesh and Pakistan) until its official annexation in 1947. In order to gain
independence, former President Jawaharlal Nehru held the Lahore Congress session in 1929 to
formalize the pursuance of complete independence from Britain. After this declaration, Britain
held three Round Table Conferences with India to make a plan for their independence
(Britannica, n.d.) These meetings led to the Government of India Act of 1935, which allowed for
an autonomous government. Nehru, the leader of the Congress party, and Mohammed Ali
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Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, supported the idea of creating a coalition government.
However, since Jinnah had not fared well in the polls, the Congress party failed to support Nehru
in his pursuit, leading to a clash between the two parties. With the refusal to join forces, Jinnah
and the Muslim League broke off from India and formed the Muslim-majority Pakistan,
officially separating itself from India and its government (Muhammad Ali Jinnah , 2019) After
Pakistan became its own country, the northern state of Kashmir became a highly contested area
and has continued to be an issue even today. The leader of Kashmir at the time, Hari Singh, was
left to decide which country his principality would join, and he chose India (Britannica, n.d.).
However, this caused a conflict between the two nations and required the United Nations to step
in and demand a cease-fire, and Nehru agreed to redraw the line of demarcation to allow for an
India-controlled side and Pakistan-controlled side (Indian-Pakistan Background, n.d.) Though
Kashmir identified more with Pakistani culture due to the majority religion of Islam and shared
common story, it was treated as a mostly Indian, mostly Hindu state.
Prior to Jammu & Kashmir’s statehood in 1947, the National Conference Party, the
secular branch of the Muslim Conference Party, mobilized the Kashmiri people and became the
progressive party. On the state level, the NC Party secured the autonomous region and negotiated
for Article 370 to be included in the Indian Constitution under section XXI, temporary
provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Chowdhary and Rao, 2004). Article
370 states that:
notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, - (a) the provisions of Article 238
shall not apply in relation to the state of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the power of
Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to – (i) those matters in
the Union List and the Concurrent List, which, in consultation with the
Government of the States, are declared by the President to correspond to matters
specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to
the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion
Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said
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Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may
by order specify (National Portal of India, 1948).
Though this article can be removed by the President of India at any time, it gives special
statehood status and some degree of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Though the NC Party
was able to bring this article into being, they did not gain its reputation for its radical ideals and
progressivity until the publication of its ideologies in the “New Kashmir Manifesto.” This work
and ideology aimed to mobilize Kashmiris to create a new, better state: one with a reorganized
political and economic structure that benefited all, that did not oppress the lower classes or
women, and abolished feudalism (Chowdhary and Rao, 2004).The work of Sheikh Abdullah, the
leader of the NC Party, was important in creating the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He is also
often credited with democratization along with the Congress Party leader Indira Gandhi.
However, it is important to note other crucial figures of the movement: Balraj Puri, former
member of the NC Party, Bhim Singh, member of the Panthers Party, and Prime Minister Moraji
Desai, who ensured free and fair elections through threat of severe punishment in the event of
electoral rigging (Widmalm, 2004).
The initial tug-of-war over the state led to hostility and wars between Pakistan and India
with no input from the people of Jammu and Kashmir as to what they wanted. Though the state
was semi-autonomous and was granted some special rights that other states were not, Kashmir
was still oppressed by the Indian government and denied basic democratic rights, such as fair and
free elections. Since Kashmir did not have the means to mobilize on their own, Pakistan decided
to step in and assist them in fighting against India using their Islamic militants. This mobilization
on behalf of the Pakistani government was likely motivated by the potential to finally claim
Kashmir as a state as well as prove to India that they are the more powerful state. Though India
was initially a secular democracy, today they have morphed into a religious extremist party,
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known as the Bharatiya Janata Party which promotes a “Hindu-first” agenda. The oppression that
Kashmir faced while India was a secular government has only gotten worse since they have
moved to the Hindu-first agenda, furthering their attempt to stamp out the voices of minorities.
Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed democracy for only a short time, however, as the legitimacy
of democracy began to crumble in just five years. The state became aware of the state corruption
and illegitimate elections, their first experience being through the NC Party and Congress Party’s
unofficial monarchial system of electing new officials.
Changes to Leadership and Party
Prior to his death in 1982, Sheikh Abdullah made his son Farooq heir to the role of leader
of the NC Party, though the position was originally supposed to go to Mirza Afzal Beg, Chief
Minister to Sheikh. When Farooq inherited the party, it was already fracturing because “much
like Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Abdullah allowed the centralized tendencies inherent in dynastic rule
to assert themselves in his party instead of building a strong and internally democratic apparatus
firmly anchored in local organizations”. 1 In short, Abdullah had lost the mobilization that had
made the party so successful in the first place. Sheikh, though a democrat in name, made several
controversial decisions that negatively impacted the Kashmiri people’s civil liberties, most
notably through the passage of the Jammu and Kashmir Safety Ordinance. The ordinance placed
“severe restrictions on newspapers and other publications within the state in the interests of
security and public order”, and despite backlash from the media, Sheikh moved to make it a legal
statute (Ganguly, 1997). By this point in Sheikh’s reign, his base grew restless, as “the educated
Muslim youth whose number multiplied several times in 30 years realized that Sheikh
Abdullah’s inconsistent behavior had done immense harm to the interests of Kashmiris” through
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the limiting of political and basic human rights, as well as limiting their economic prospects
(Ganguly, 1997). Though the economy was successful under Sheikh due to support from New
Delhi, the newly educated Kashmiris were not content to work the trade jobs they typically had;
instead, they wanted more job growth in new sectors where they could use their educations
(Ganguly, 1997). This discontent was not only experienced on an individual level, but a
community level as well. The NC Party had turned into an unrecognizable representative of the
people, causing restlessness amongst members.
NC Party members also were discontented due to the organization and changing values of
the party. What once was the radical, progressive party of Kashmir had morphed into something
unrecognizable. The NC Party was built on this idea of a new Kashmir, a state that would lift up
the voices of the oppressed and economically liberate both the state and the people. Yet
somehow, such ideals had changed, and Sheikh Abdullah instead began stripping crucial civil
liberties that other Indians still had (Ganguly, 1997). These factors, along with a sudden influx of
Assamese Muslims to Kashmir after a massacre in the village of Nellie in 1983 and the ethnic
and military mobilization by the Pakistani president, all contributed to Muslim fundamentalism
in the Valley for the first time (Ganguly, 1997).
Mobilization of Kashmir
To mobilize disenfranchised Kashmiris, Zia-ul-Haq, the president of Pakistan (19781988), “used the Pakistani army’s powerful Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) organization to fund,
organize, and train young, disaffected Kashmiris imbued with recently discovered Islamic fervor
to challenge the writ of the Indian state” (Ganguly, 1997). Prior to the Pakistani government
aiding the Kashmir Valley, President Zia-ul-Haq had reformed the criminal law system in his
own country in what is referred to as the Hudood Ordinances with the intention of bringing
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“Pakistan’s legal system closer to the precepts of Islam” (Ganguly, 1997). The Ordinances
changed how crimes, punishments, and evidentiary requirements were distinguished to align
them more closely with the Quran and Sunnah (Ganguly, 1997). Of particular interest is the
uneven implementation of the Hudood Ordinances across the nation. According to author
Charles H. Kennedy, “fully 80% of the cases tried under the Hudood statutes originated in the
Punjab, 12% in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), only 7% in Sind, and less than 1% in
Baluchistan” (Kennedy, 1988). He opines that there are distinct cultural differences between the
Punjab province, which is mostly urban, and the other regions, which are mostly rural, dictating
how crimes are handled. Zina-related crimes, which refer to sex, may be handled within families
and communities in rural areas, while Punjabis are more likely to take such crimes to court
(Kennedy, 1988). In regards to the case of Kashmir, it is most notable that the Punjab province
borders the state of Kashmir and both territories have a Muslim majority. When considering the
recent changes in government and the justice system that President Zia-ul-Haq had made in his
own country, it is clear to see that he would have a vested interest in mobilizing dissatisfied
Kashmiri Muslims.
Secularism and Religiosity
While it was noted by author Sten Widmalm that it was unclear how much influence
Pakistan had on Kashmir, Ganguly believes that the Pakistani influence was one of several
influences regarding the change to Muslim fundamentalism. It is likely that the mobilization and
training of the Kashmiris by the Pakistani government had a significant impact on the transition
to Muslim fundamentalism, if only because the people needed an outside force to help them
mobilize. With the support of the ISI organization and President Zia-ul-Haq, they were able to do
so effectively and quickly. India as a whole nation, on the other hand, was a secular democracy,
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so one state beginning to identify at least in part with Muslim fundamentalism was in stark
contrast to the Indian government. Though India chose to believe there was a distinct difference
between secular nationalism and religion, scholar Mark Juergensmeyer claims that there is
actually very little difference between the two.
When comparing secular nationalism and religion, one can see many similarities: “both
are expressions of faith, both involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community, and
both insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the leadership of that
community” (Juergensmeyer, 1993). A secular government in India was purported to be
beneficial in two ways: one, that in a Hindu-majority country, those who were marginalized by
the Hindu caste system – the Muslims and untouchables – would be protected if religion were
irrelevant in government decisions. However, those who most strongly upheld the idea of a
secular government were not the bottom of the caste system, but rather the urban, educated elite
(Juergensmeyer, 1993). By separating religion and government from one another, they could
avoid “the obstacles that religious loyalties create for a country’s political goals”
(Juregensmeyer, 1993). Through interviewing people living in a secular government and people
living in a government fueled by religion, however, Juergensmeyer reports that he heard similar
sentiments about the pitfalls of secularism from both sides: leaders are selfish politicians who
have no interest in promoting the welfare of people or betterment of society (1993). Though
these interviews took place in the 1990s in other parts of India, they still reflect the discontent
with a secular government and help the reader in understanding what fueled Muslim
fundamentalism in Kashmir.
Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi: The Fight for Power
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Prior to the 1980 election, Sheikh Abdullah introduced the Resettlement Bill which
allowed anyone who had emigrated from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan before May 1954 to
return. From the perspective of the Congress Party, this was seen as a ploy to gain more votes for
the NC Party. On the other hand, the NC Party claimed that the Congress Party did not want to
uphold the constitutional rights of former citizens. There were several glaring issues with the
Resettlement Bill: allowing Pakistani citizens to come back to their former state of Kashmir
could invite a security issue for not only the state, but also all of India (Ganguly, 1997). Prime
Minister Gandhi was especially suspicious of Pakistanis’ intentions due to the history of conflict
between the two states over Kashmir. In the eyes of the state, any resettled Kashmiri had the
potential to be a terrorist or spy for Pakistan. From a regional standpoint, Kashmir’s counterpart,
citizens in Jammu, were largely Hindu and Sikh and had settled on former Muslim property and
feared retaliation from returning Kashmiri Muslims (Ganguly, 1997). The introduction of this
bill prior to the 1977 election created a rift between the two parties and led to both parties
contesting all seats in a bid to create a majority (Widmalm, 2004). The bill was passed in 1982
shortly before Sheikh’s death, but Farooq had already been anointed to take over the party in
1981 upon his father’s death. In the end, the NC Party won 46 of the 75 seats, the Congress Party
won 26, and the independents gained only three seats in the election. Despite the controversy and
discontent within the NC Party, they still gained the majority of seats and few people swayed
from the party to vote for an alternative candidate.
At the time, B.K. Nehru was the governor of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the cousin of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Nehru’s situation became increasingly more complicated as his
cousin and leader of the country pressured him to remove his second-in-command, Abdullah, for
being an alleged threat to national security. However, Nehru was fond of Abdullah, and refused
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to accede to the central government’s requests, ultimately resulting in Gandhi’s decision to
relocate Nehru to governor of Gujarat and replace him with Jagmohan (Widmalm, 2004).
While Indira Gandhi had claimed that Abdullah was a threat to national security, would
invade Pakistan, and that he was actually a member of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(a party that supported the independence of the state from both India and Pakistan), there may
have been other issues that were not addressed (Widmalm, 2004). According to B.K. Nehru,
Gandhi had made it her goal to remove Farooq Abdullah from power because she believed he
was behind an incident that occurred at a campaign event where she was harassed. Though she
could never confirm that Abdullah was behind the attack, she blamed it on him for the rest of his
political career. Both Nehru and the following governor, Jagmahon, knew her intention to change
the leadership in Jammu and Kashmir, though she had never explicitly stated it. Another
potential reason that she wanted to change leadership in the state is because the deterioration of
state-centered relations could be traced back to Abdullah when he joined the opposition conclave
at the end of the election cycle (Widmalm, 2004).
The opposition conclave, headed by the leader of the regional Telugu Desam, T.N. Rama
Rao, consisted of twenty-four leaders of varying parties to condemn Prime Minister Gandhi’s
leadership. From the summer of May 1983 to January 1984, the conclave met four times to
discuss the need for more state autonomy; however, opposition unity failed due to two parties
splitting from the group (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). Gandhi perceived Abdullah’s disloyalty as yet
another attack on her leadership. Such a move was unprecedented in Indian politics; the NC
Party and the Congress Party, though different, typically saw eye to eye and historically
supported the other. The tension between Abdullah and Gandhi was not a conflict of party
interests, but rather personal conflicts between the two leaders. By Abdullah attending
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opposition conclaves and agreeing to a statement that criticized Gandhi’s power, he was publicly
displaying distrust in the Congress Party. Such opposition could seriously damage the legitimacy
and power of Gandhi, especially during an election cycle (Widmalm, 2004). In addition to
undermining Gandhi’s power, Abdullah’s attendance was also seen as a ploy to influence
national politics by drawing Muslim voters away from the Congress Party (Ganguly, 1997). Up
until this time in India’s brief history as an independent nation, save for 33 months, the Congress
Party had always been in power (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). However, such power has only been held
onto by a slim margin, and any defectors could lead to another party ruling India. Perhaps more
important to Gandhi than the party itself maintaining power is her family maintaining power:
“she has sought to transform the party into an instrument of personal power and to assure that it
nurtures no one who might challenge her position as prime minister or endanger the succession
of her children – first Sanjay, now Rajiv” (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). Gandhi’s belief that Abdullah
had organized the verbal attack at a political convention, in conjunction with the opposition
conclaves, ultimately led to her ousting Abdullah in order to protect the party and her family. In
1983, elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir for the first time since Sheikh Abdullah’s
death, and Indira Gandhi was determined to win the state. To do so, she sought the support of
Jammu, the largely Hindu part of the state by attempting to appeal to their similar identities.
Though the Congress Party was touted as secular, as many of the political parties at the time
were, Gandhi thought that she may be able to appeal to more people by mobilizing their identity.
Since religion did not play a large role in Indian politics at the time, PM Gandhi could not try to
mobilize Kashmir solely on their shared sameness; rather, they emphasized the “alleged
corruption and economic mismanagement” by the NC Party (Ganguly, 1997).
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By July 24, 1984, the NC Party lost the majority holding of seats due to the defection of
thirteen members of the legislative assembly, providing the Congress Party the opportunity to
remove Abdullah as Chief Minister. It is worth noting that those who led the defection were
Ghulam Mohammed Shah, the brother-in-law of Abdullah, and Devi Das Thakur, a High Court
lawyer, and “planned to withdraw support from Abdullah and form a new government with the
support of Congress” (Widmalm, 2004). In May of 1984 Ghulam Mohammed Shah, the leader of
the thirteen defectors of the NC Party and the brother-in-law of Abdullah, held what he called the
“real” NC convention, with Farooq Abdullah holding one of his own several days later. The
splinter convention hosted by Jagmahon legitimatized the defection of the thirteen members of
the legislative assembly (twelve NC members and one independent) and the letter of defection
was signed in June of 1984. (Widmalm, 2004).
Jagmohan suggested that governor’s rule be implemented since the NC had lost the
majority, but Abdullah wanted to follow the constitutional proceedings, which allowed for a vote
of confidence (Widmalm, 2004). According to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution, Article 92
states that:
if at any time the Sadar-i-Riyasat [governor] is satisfied that a situation has arisen
in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution, the Sadar-i-Riyasat may by proclamation: (a)
assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and
all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by anybody or authority of the
State; (b) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the
Sadar-i-Riyasat to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the
Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the
operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to the High Court.
(Kashmir, 1956).
Thakur, the other leader of the defection and the High Court Leader, ruled that what Shah had
done was legal and democratic, when it fact it was not. Though Shah claimed to be
uncomfortable with the process and said that he only proposed governor’s rule to oppose the
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central government, the legitimacy of the constitution had already been called into question by
the people (Widmalm, 2004). On the other hand, Abdullah was well within his rights to request a
vote of confidence, but he was denied this by the central government and Jagmahon blindly
followed the orders of the central government, which many thought was an undemocratic
response to a standard request. (Widmalm, 2004).
During Nehru’s reign as governor, there had certainly been some instances of violence
and curfew implementation; however, January 19th, the day Jagmohan came into power, is often
regarded as a “watershed moment” for Kashmiris (Bose et al., 1990). On the first day of
Jagmohan’s governance, illegal searches and raids were conducted by para-military forces and
four hundred young people were forced out of their homes and beaten, all without the knowledge
of local civil authorities (Bose et al., 1990). By January 21st, more than 20,000 people had taken
to the streets to protest, resulting in the additional deaths of at least sixty people, but unofficial
reports claim up to two hundred deaths (Bose et al., 1990). On the following day, Kashmiris
again took to the streets to protest, but this time protested the deaths from the previous day. On
January 22nd, 100 people died in the protest, and survivors interviewed recalled para-military
forces attempting to block the injured from getting to the hospital (Bose et al., 1990). Jagmahon
had seemingly no control over the situation, but maintained his power for nearly two years.
During this time period, Gandhi put Operation Blue Star into effect in the state of Punjab, which
borders both Pakistan and Kashmir, to fight Sikh extremists. For four days, the battle against the
Golden Temple raised on, killing the leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, most of his
snipers, and hundreds of innocent people. To further prove the strength of the central
government, Gandhi then enlisted in the help of several newspapers to portray Abdullah as a
Sikh sympathizer (Schofield, 2003). Because Abdullah had met with Bhindranwale earlier that
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same year, “Farooq was charged with secretly supporting the Sikh separatists and of permitting
them to train in the state of Jammu and Kashmir” (Schofield, 2003). Though he and his
government denied it, Gandhi’s allegations against ultimately led to the defection that lost the
NC Party its majority in Kashmir.
The mounting conflict between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu & Kashmir
carried on for years.However, the state and its people had almost no say in the matter because
they experienced unfair elections and were also considered uneducated people. With the
assistance of Pakistan, Kashmiri Muslim militants have been able to mobilize against the Indian
state in an attempt to protect their rights as an autonomous state. Since the 1980s, both India and
Kashmir have moved from secularism to religious-based politics: India to the far-right, Hindu
nationalist party, and Kashmir to Muslim fundamentalism. Moving into the case study, we apply
what we have learned about India, Pakistan, and Kashmir’s history and view the Kashmir
insurgency through a constructivist lens.
CASE STUDY 1
Though India has the largest secular democracy in the world, the country has had to
combat its deep roots in colonialism, feudalism, and the caste-system (Nanda, 2007). Under
British rule, the Government of India Act of 1935 emphasized the importance of communal
representation through politics, namely religious identity (Thakur, 1993). To gain political
power, religious leaders focused on building followings to ensure a spot in the government.
Though leaders like Ali Jinnah, known as the father of Pakistan, became well-known as the
leader of Muslims in a predominantly Hindu area, the religious minorities made up only twenty
percent of the population of India (Thakur, 1993). Since Hindus made up eighty percent of the
population, religious minorities feared that Hindus would form a massive voting bloc and
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effectively present minority representation (Thakur, 1993). According to author Ramesh Thakur,
one of the main principles of the Indian Constitution is to maintain secularism. Secularism can be
interpreted and defined in several ways: “equal and due respect for all religions and faiths,
expressed in Sanskrit as sarva dharma samabhav (let all religions prosper); or separation of the
state from the church (Thakur, 1993). But in its second meaning secularism militated against the
historical relationship between state and church in India in both the Hindu and Islamic context”
(Thakur, 1993). And yet, there is a third form of secularism referred to in Indian politics as
“positive secularism”. Positive secularism, which was generally against secularism, was
followed by leftist parties and the Congress Party “which, according to the BJP, was only
favouring the minorities particularly the Muslims and was hurting the interests of Hindus”
(Misra, 2018). Though secularism was made to be a fundamental principle of the Constitution, it
does not explicitly state that all religions will be protected. For this reason, the Constitution also
has a separate group of rights to ensure religious freedom.
As an agnostic, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a key supporter of India being a
secular country (Rajeskhariah, 1987). To Nehru, secularism was not the absence of religion, but
rather “his idea of secularism envisaged a political structure in which the individual was not
subject to any social inequalities imposed by religious sanctions” (Rajeskhariah, 1987).
Rajasekhariah concludes in his article on Nehru’s commitment to ensuring India would be a
secular state that “secularism was a practical necessity in India as a solution to the problem of
religious diversity which was a challenge to her unity, harmony and social stability” (1987). As
Nehru once described it, “the people of the Indian subcontinent, despite a variety of religions,
languages, castes, and races, shared an overarching historical and cultural experience and had
common racial roots in the different regions, that made them all uniquely Indian. Where religion
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may separate them, language, race, and culture also united them” (Thomas, 2004). India took a
strong stance on their commitment to secularism for most of their independence, only switching
to a more religious form of politics with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 1990s.
Despite this change, India continued its legacy as the largest democracy in the world.
For most of India’s independence, the separation of church and state was pronounced.
The National Congress Party and the Congress Party (the two major political parties) had policy
differences, but mostly supported on another. National elections were free and fair, thanks to the
efforts of Balraj Puri, former member of the NC Party, Bhim Singh, member of the Panthers
Party, and Prime Minister Moraji Desai, in addition to the leaders of the NC and Congress Party
at the time, Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi. Almost immediately after the democratization
of national elections in 1952, the legitimacy of elections in Jammu and Kashmir deteriorated. As
mentioned previously in the first case study, the succession from Sheikh Abdullah to Farooq
Abdullah was unexpected, as Sheikh not only had a different successor to the position, but
several other qualified members in his cabinet that could have justly served as his replacement.
His son Farooq was a doctor of medicine and had no experience in politics, so his appointment
was rather jarring to those involved in the party. In addition to the change in leadership, a
combination of several factors contributed to violence in the capital and the mobilization of
Kashmiris: one, the realization that their state was the only in India to have compromised
elections; two, the lack of ability to express dissent; and three, the increase in education level
across the state (Ganguly, 1997). The most important factor in Kashmir’s political development
and ethnic mobilization was their ability to access both traditional and Muslim education.
Pakistan’s First Attempt to Mobilize Kashmir
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Prior to the 1970s, Jammu and Kashmir experienced lower rates of literacy and education
as well as lack of access to mass media, contributing to low political sophistication (Ganguly,
1996). During the 1960s, a series of events led to the Pakistani military infiltrating the Kashmir
valley, but perhaps most notably is the initial event that led to the conflict. In 1963, anti-Indian
riots broke out in the valley “following the theft of a holy relic, believed to be a hair of the
Prophet Mohammad, from the Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar, the capital city of Jammu and
Kashmir” (Ganguly, 1996). Pakistan assumed that Kashmir was pro-Pakistan due to the state’s
defense of Islam and the discontent expressed towards India (Ganguly, 1996). Also contributing
to Pakistan’s decision to infiltrate the valley was the death of Prime Minister Nehru as it was
assumed that unity in India would crumble; specifically, Pakistani leaders believed that class,
caste, and ethnic cleavages would ruin the already tenuous union (Ganguly, 1996). Since
Pakistani leaders were convinced that Kashmir had turned against India, they were dismayed to
find that Kashmiris did not revolt, despite their anti-India sentiments. Even though the Kashmiris
were discontent with India, they “lacked awareness of their political plight and the requisite
organizational impetus, and therefore did not vigorously challenge the existing order” (Ganguly,
1996). Though Pakistan gave Kashmiris the perfect opportunity to mobilize and revolt against
India, they were unable to mobilize due to their lack of political prowess and education.
However, in the following years, Kashmir gained access to the mass media they had been
missing out on and improved their overall education. In addition to a forty-three percent increase
in literacy rates from 1971 to 1981 in the state, there was also an increase in Muslim education,
through madrassas, a form of Muslim education that emphasizes fundamentalism and radicalism
(Ganguly, 1997).
The Muslim Education
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Part of the increase in Muslim education can be attributed to the influx of Bangladeshi
Muslim religious teachers in Kashmir due to a massacre in their home village, (Ganguly 1997) as
well as the Saudi monetary influence on the schools (Nasr, 2001). The Saudis invested money
into these schools that “use Islamic ideology as a way of creating a very efficient guerrilla army
with a very clear anti-communist ideology” (Nasr, 2001). A typical madrassa syllabus includes:
learning of the holy Koran by heart, tajweed (correct pronunciation of Koranic
verses), tafseer (interpretation of holy scriptures), fiqah (Islamic jurisprudence),
shariah (Islamic law), ahadis (life and decisions of the holy Prophet on various
issues brought before him by the faithful), mantiq (philosophy), riazi
(mathematics) and falakiat (astronomy) and tabligh (spreading the word of God)
(Bandyopadhyay, 2002).
The interpretation of Islam in the madrassas education is referred to as Wahhabi, which is
an extreme orthodoxy of the religion that the majority of Muslims do not practice (Nasr, 2001).
Wahhabi is the same interpretation of the Quran that Al-Qaeda uses, and the Saudi-funded
madrassas were the same schools that members of the terrorist organization attended (Nasr,
2001). To understand why this type of Muslim education is significant in Jammu and Kashmir, it
is important to note that Pakistan, who controls one-third of the contested area, is largely
Muslim, and India, who controls the other two-thirds of the state, is majority Hindu. Pakistan
also had moved to a more fundamentalist Muslim rule of law in 1979, and so the mobilization of
Kashmiri Muslims coincided with this timeline. It is important to emphasize that the religion of
Islam is not inherently violent or terroristic; however, this particular interpretation of the
scripture is extremist and reactionary. This sect of Islam is not popular amongst those who
practice and represents only those who are involved in madrassas. Amongst the people of
Kashmir, there was a physical and religious disconnect as well: Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir,
and the surrounding valley is predominantly Muslim; Ladakh (now known as the districts of Leh
and Kargil), was predominantly Buddhist and Muslim, and Jammu is predominantly Hindu
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(Ganguly, 1996). Jammu and Kashmir also developed their own separate cultures due to
geographic boundaries. Jammu and Kashmir are separated by 15,000-feet mountain ranges, and
Kashmir is separated from the rest of India by the valley (Ganguly, 1996). Because of
geographic and religious differences, Kashmir and its people did not form a common identity
with Jammu or India. This isolation from others that may have common interests forced Kashmir
to form their own regional sub-community with specific concerns (Ganguly, 1996). The lack of
connection to the state of India likely also had an effect on the feelings of hostility towards the
state. If Kashmiris had felt connected to India in any way, they may have been less inclined to
wage an attack on the state.
The mounting discontent felt by Kashmiri people in regards to the Indian government can
be attributed to all of the aforementioned reasons: increase in literacy and education, access to
Muslim education and mobilization, and geographical boundaries. Once Kashmiris recognized
that the secular politics of the state were working against their interests, they chose to mobilize
along ethnoreligious lines (Ganguly, 1996). By 1989, “a significant number of the Muslim
inhabitants of the valley began a movement of protest, which was both an armed struggle and a
political rejection of their continuing allegiance to the Indian Union” (Schofield, 2003). By 1987,
the newly educated Kashmiris were aware that the Indian government was taking advantage of
them by rigging elections to keep the NC Party and Congress Party in power. In 1990, the entire
state of Jammu and Kashmir was placed under the purview of the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act, which allows for the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir or the central government to declare
Kashmir a “disturbed” area (“Kashmir Assembly Election: How Free and Fair?”, 2003). A
disturbed area or state requires military intervention to prevent “activities involving terrorist
acts” or “activities directed toward disclaiming, questioning, or disrupting the sovereignty and
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territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or
secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian
National Flag, the Indian National Anthem, and the Constitution of India” (Refworld, 2012).
There were more than 55,000 security officers involved in polling duty during the 1990 election
(“Kashmir Assembly Election: How Free and Fair?”, 2003). Besides the National Congress and
Congress parties, two other parties emerged: the BJP and the Muslim United Front. Unsure of
their ability to win fairly, the National Congress Party and the Congress Party “weighed down
potential rivals, specifically the MUF, arresting many of its leaders and workers before the
polling and after for vaguely termed “antinational activities”.
The Muslim United Front gained notoriety and was able to contest the elections.
However, speaking out against the two most powerful parties in the country had its
consequences: “political activists linked to the MUF were imprisoned without bail for months
under the draconian Public Safety Act (PSA) and treated inhumanely” (Mohanty, 2018). This
only gave the MUF and its supporters more reasons to be upset with the national leadership, and
so many of those activists imprisoned led the Kashmir insurgency once released (Mohanty,
2018). Prior to these incidents, the state of India did not recognize the desires of different
political parties or groups in Kashmir, catering mostly to the needs of the National Congress
Party members and Congress Party members, as those were the two main political parties in
power in the state. According to Mohanty, the 1989 insurgency was a result of “the state’s failure
to reconcile informal and formal nationalisms led to inaudible sub-state spheres of representation
and finally the bursting forth of these inaudible sub-state spheres into full-blown secessionist
movement in the event of an over-politicized state repressing democratic opposition” (Mohanty,
2018). These sub-state spheres of representation that Mohanty refers to are the geographically
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and religiously divided groups within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since different regions of
the state formed their own cultures and identities, the Kashmiri groups felt disconnected from
others in the state or people who shared a similar religious background because they felt that
their issues were not the same. Therefore, they formed their own sub-groups to air their different
grievances. However, as these groups became more and more fractionalized, their grievances
became less able to be heard as they lacked representation on a grand scale. Though the groups
had different needs, they did share at least one common goal: standing up to the Indian national
government. This event, better known as the insurgency, serves as a catalyst for the current day
tension between India and Kashmir, as the insurgency displaced thousands of Hindu people and
disrupted the total control Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had over the country.
The Kashmir insurgency began in 1989 when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
kidnapped Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Indian Minister of Home Affairs (Ganguly,
1996). The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is responsible for internal security, border patrol,
center-state relations, administration of Union Territories, management of Central Armed Police
Forces, amongst other objectives. Knowing the responsibilities of the MHA, targeting Dr.
Sayeed was not a random act, but a calculated plot to wage a conflict with the state.
Additionally, Dr. Sayeed was used as collateral in the release of imprisoned members of the
JKLF, resulting in their freedom just a few days later (Ganguly, 1996). Following the release of
Dr. Sayeed and JKLF prisoners, insurgencies broke out across the Kashmir Valley, killing
anyone in their path: government officials, security, and passersby alike (Ganguly, 1996). When
the Soviet Union released many of their weaponry after the Cold War to Kashmir and Pakistan,
the Kashmiri independence movement took on a more Islamist ideology (Peace Direct, n.d.).
Approximately 100,000 Kashmiri Pandits fled the valley and headed south towards Jammu to
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protect their lives (Essa, 2011). While the head of the KPSS, an organization that protects the
rights of the remaining Kashmiri Pandits, claims that approximately 650 Kashmiri Pandits were
killed, other reports claim up to 4,000 deaths (Essa, 2011). In total, it is reported that 34,000
people were killed between 1978 and 1990 (Peace Direct, n.d.). In response to the violence
against the Pandits, the Indian government retaliated and engaged in the conflict as well.
Though there were numerous groups “of varying ideological orientations, all the insurgent
groups professed opposition to Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir, and the authority of the
Indian state virtually collapsed there” (Ganguly, 1996). Ganguly explains that this particular case
of insurgency demonstrates that from a theoretical standpoint, states will face grave danger when
faced with institutional decay and political mobilization (Ganguly, 1996). The theoretical
framework explained above also holds policy significance: “as economic modernization
proceeds, growing levels of literacy, higher education, and media exposure will contribute to
increased political mobilization” (Ganguly, 1996). These improvements, along with those cited
in Fearon and Laitin’s paper, help to explain how Islamic militants in Kashmir were able to
mobilize against Hindus in the state.
Ethnicity and Insurgency
One of the studies analyzed in the literature review can also be applied to the case of
Kashmir. Conducted by Fearon and Laitin, they explore ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war
through eleven hypotheses, several of which are relevant to the case of Kashmir and will be
discussed here. The first hypothesis that the authors propose is that “measures of a country’s
ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war”; however, they
later reject this hypothesis (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This idea is what much of civil conflict and
war is based upon, including the case of Kashmir. Because Kashmir is majority Muslim and
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Jammu and the rest of India is majority Hindu, a common assumption made is that the reason for
the conflict is based in religious contention. While their conflicting ideologies are at play in the
present day, this has not always been true of the relationship between the nation and the state.
The ethnic and religious diversity in India does not play into the conflict between Kashmir and
India. In fact, the National Congress Party, the ruling party of India, was a secular party and the
BJP, the Hindu-nationalist party of today, hardly won any seats before the 1990s. The conflicts
between the two were established far before ethnicity became relevant in India, so Fearon and
Laitin’s hypothesis is also rejected in this situation. This hypothesis ties into the next one in the
paper, which states that “countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at
a greater risk for civil war” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While the ethnicity of Kashmiris is
convoluted due to former colonization of India and Pakistan, Kashmiris share a common religion
with Pakistan and feel that they identify more with Pakistanis. This is especially obvious as the
tension between the Indian state and the state of Kashmir grows, mounting after a stolen Muslim
artefact was traced back to India. Though the main conflict between the state and nation did not
originally stem from their ethnic differences, it did play a small part based on demographics and
potential mobilization from the neighboring nation of Pakistan.
Unrelated to ethnicity, Fearon and Laitin hypothesize that “the presence of (a) rough
terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor
insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, cross-border sanctuaries and
(c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents”.
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The state of Kashmir has all three of these characteristics. Firstly,
Kashmir is home to the westernmost part of the Himalayas whose foothills reach up to 7,000 feet
in the state. There are also numerous valleys and other mountain ranges that make travel in the
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region difficult for most, but ideal for insurgents. Mountainous and familiar terrain aids in
insurgents’ ability to quickly go into hiding and spread their forces out. Since the opposition, in
this case the Indian government, is not as familiar with the Himalayan mountain range, seeking
out the insurgents becomes more difficult. Secondly, Kashmir borders Pakistan, a foreign and
cross-border sanctuary because the country is sympathetic towards the insurgency due to their
shared opposition towards India and their propensity for Islam. Finally, the local population can
be induced not to report back to the state because the Hindu minority in the state would likely be
threatened, while the Muslim population would support the cause or at the least remain silent. In
regards to the third part of the hypothesis, the authors expand on this idea in a separate piece
explaining the reasons non-rebels provide support to rebels. Fearon and Laitin cite that nonrebels may support rebels in the hopes that they will be able to put pressure on the government to
make valuable changes, provide a sense of gratification for supporting a group that is actively
against the state, and protect themselves from rebels who may attack unsupportive locals (Fearon
and Laitin, 1999). Prior to the beginning of the insurgency between Kashmir and India, a small
series of skirmishes broke out along the border dividing Kashmir from Pakistan to test the Indian
government’s reaction. This was also likely a test to see how the terrain could work in the favor
of the insurgents, though it is not confirmed in literature.
Additionally, the following hypotheses from Fearon and Laitin is applicable to the case of
Kashmir:
the political and military technology of insurgency will be favored, and thus civil
war made more likely, when potential rebels face or have available the following:
(a) a newly independent state, which suddenly loses the coercive backing of the
former imperial power and whose military capabilities are new and untested; (b)
political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization and
weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion; (c) a
regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features, as this is likely to indicate
political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state
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incapacity; (d) a large country population, which makes it necessary for the center
to multiply the layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local
level and also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a
given level of income; and (f) foreign governments or diasporas willing to supply
weapons, money, and training (Fearon and Laitin, 1999).
India became independent from the British Empire in 1947, making it a new state. Prior to the
insurgency in Kashmir, India had been involved with several other wars since their
independence, all between India and Pakistan or India and China. India and Pakistan were both
ruled by the British Empire, and once the two countries were split due to their religious
differences, Kashmir became a hotly contested area. At the beginning of the two countries’
independence, the ruler of Kashmir was Hindu, but sixty percent of the population was Muslim,
causing the initial conflict over which country should rule Kashmir (Horimoto, 2005). Since
India’s inception, the country has been in four wars, one with China over a northeast territory of
India, two with Pakistan over Kashmir, and one with Pakistan over Bangladesh (Horimoto,
2005). The wars between Pakistan and India are particularly significant in understanding the
Kashmir conflict because of the two nations’ differing ideologies. The founding of Pakistan was
based on the two-nation theory, which “maintained that as long as two ethnic groups existed in
British India under British Rule, namely, Hindus and Muslims, then it was logical that two
nations be created” (Horimoto, 2005). This theory then supported the idea that Kashmir, a
majority Muslim state, belonged under the rule of Pakistan. However, since the Indian National
Congress Party made secularism the focal point of national unity; including a state that is
majority Muslim in a majority Hindu country upholds the idea of ethnic homogeneity instead of
supporting the two-nation theory (Horimoto, 2005).This tension between the two countries
contributes to future events, specifically the Kashmir insurgency.
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At the beginning of the conflict, Pakistan infiltrated insurgents into Indian territories in an
“effort to jump-start the flagging insurgency in Kashmir” (Jaffrelot, 2004). Though India had
suspected that Pakistan was mobilizing young Islamic men to stage an insurgency, their initial
infiltration all but proved their position. Before Pakistan stepped in to help mobilize the Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front, the group was disorganized and lacking a plan. Once Pakistan
began giving assistance to the JKLF (see the foreign government argument of Fearnon and
Laitin’s hypothesis), they were able to prove a serious threat to India. Combining the arguments
on political instability, a democratic/autocratic regime, and population size of Fearnon and
Laitin’s hypothesis, the Indian government and the National Congress Party was run by the
Gandhi family, namely Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Though India is a democracy, Gandhi
applied some autocratic features to her regime, such as suppressing voters in the North and doing
anything possible to keep the NC Party in power. As seen in the background section, Farooq
Abdullah was punished for joining a group that harshly criticized the prime minister. Though
Farooq was a member of the Congress Party and not the NC Party, the two had always worked
together and so Gandhi took this as a personal attack. The insecurity of the Prime Minister
regarding both her power and her party’s power indicates a level of instability within the national
government, making them vulnerable to the Kashmiri insurgency. Additionally, as the largest
democracy in the world, boasting a population of one billion people, it is impossible for the state
to know the whereabouts and intentions of every one of its states or citizens. Given the distance
between the capital and Kashmir, the central government is somewhat detached from the north,
providing the opportunity for Kashmiri insurgents to mobilize before the national government
can react.
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For the first three decades of India’s independence there were two major parties in
Kashmir, the National Conference Party and the Congress Party. Both parties were secular,
meaning they were not defined by a religious or ethnic identity and solely relied on their politics
to win elections. During elections, the seats were hotly contested, but only for the two major
parties. In 1981, even amongst a major rift between the parties over the Resettlement Bill, the
two political parties took nearly all of the seats. While the NC Party won 46 of the 75 seats and
the Congress Party won 26, only three of the votes went to independent candidates (Ganguly,
1997). Since the 1980s, there has been a major shift in political ideology and party leadership, as
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is now “the richest, largest, and most dominant political party in
India” (Misra, 2018). To gain votes at the beginning of the party’s rise to power, Advani, the BJP
president, “used the Hindutva rhetoric of “pseudo secularism” and “Muslim appeasement” to
great effect in winning popular support among the Hindus, aided by the soft-Hindutva politics
the Indian National Congress played then” (Misra, 2018). “Hindutva” combines the Hindu past
“by recalling great warriors like Rana Pratap and shivaji who fought against the ‘oppressive’
Muslim emperors in the seventeenth century”, but also supports the Western opinions of
capitalism (Yajnika and Sheth, 2005). There is no one agreed upon definition of Hindutva, but
Misra explains its origin use as “making Hindus strong and militant by asserting that Hindu
interest is national interest” (Misra, 2018). In addition to the return to the Hindutva agenda, the
BJP found support because “the electorate wanted a change from the long years of Congress
rule”, and the BJP proved to be a legitimate alternative to the Congress party (Misra, 2018).
Around the same time that Hindutva became mainstream in the 1980s, The term
“Kashmiriyat” became relevant to the public as well, popularized by Farooq Abdullah for the
National Congress Party (Tak, 2013). Kashmiriyat is Kashmiri nationalism, and the term was
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spread by Sheikh Abdullah promoting it through mass media, “political rallies, populist appeals
for land reform and political equality, and religious sermons” (Arakotaram, n.d.) Instead of
mobilizing along religious lines, Abdullah intended for Kashmiriyat to mobilize along ethnic
lines to unite the people of the valley; however, a common ethnicity did not exist (Arakotaram,
n.d.) The Kashmiri Liberation Front (KLF), employed the philosophy behind Kashmiriyat in
recruiting supporters, “declaring that the minorities ‘should realize that this [support to
separatism] is the only way of preserving their own existence and culture of which they are so
fond of’” (Tak, 2013). Author Arakotaram argues that Kashmiri nationalism is built on Roger
Smith’s theoretical framework, the people-building model. The people-building model is based
on three assumptions: “political communities are neither natural nor primordial, political
communities are constructed by elites who articulate and institutionalize conceptions of political
peoplehood, and both leaders and citizens have considerable flexibility in the type of peoplebuilding they advance and support” (Arakotaram, n.d.) The case of Kashmir provides the perfect
example for the people-building model, as both India’s and Pakistan’s government were able to
mobilize people to advance their own personal goals. As mentioned previously, India had always
been a secular government until the people tired of the reign of the Gandhis and sought out a new
party. By amplifying the soft Hindutva policies of the National Congress Party, the BJP was able
to mobilize voters and get them to stand behind their harsh, extremist policies that promoted an
“India-first” attitude. The India-first attitude, of course, did not include lower-castes, and
especially not Indian Muslims. The idea behind Hindutva was to promote the interests of Hindus
first and foremost, which is also the focus of the BJP. Kashmiriyat came about due indirectly to
the role of Pakistan in mobilizing and training young Islamic insurgents to rise against the state.
The traditional and Muslim education that Kashmiris received not only gave them the resources
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necessary to become politically engaged, but it also gave them a sense of community through
religion. Kashmiriyat was used primarily as a term of sub-nationalism, however, it was also used
to create a distinction between Kashmir and the rest of the Indian state, who promoted Hindutva.
CONCLUSION
What does a future for Kashmir look like? In 2019, India revoked Article 370, stripping
Jammu & Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. The Indian government also shut off the
internet in Kashmir for seven months, beginning in August of 2019 while limited internet access
was available for Jammu (BBC World News, 2020). The “blackout”, as it is commonly referred
to, has been received poorly by the rest of the world (BBC World News, 2020). As the supposed
largest democracy in the world, cutting off the internet and phone access of its citizens is seen as
an act more indicative of a dictatorship. Among the thousands of Kashmiris placed under house
arrest, two of these victims of the state were Farooq Abdullah and former chief minister, Omar
Abdullah under the Public Safety Act (BBC World News, 2020). In the latest news, journalists
are fearful to continue their professions as they are being threatened by Indian law enforcement
for supposedly supporting terrorism (BBC World News, 2020). One of the most controversial
reports to come out of Kashmir in the present-day is the passing of the Citizenship Amendment
Bill, which allows those religious minorities from neighboring countries to seek refuge in India
(Perrigo, 2019). The religious minorities included in the bill are Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jains,
Parsi, or Buddhist; however, even Muslims minorities who have faced persecution in other
countries are not included, though they may be considered on a case by case basis (Perrigo,
2019). Though the bill does not persecute Muslims in their own country, “opponents are also
concerned that the Citizenship Amendment Bill undermines India’s constitutionally mandated
secularism, and could make it easier for Muslims within India to be thrown in prison and even
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deported if they cannot prove their Indian citizenship” (Perrigo, 2019). Such news reports being
released about the largest democracy in the world are not what the rest of the world would expect
from India; it is something that most would associate with the governments of China, North
Korea, or Russia. The potential for Kashmir to gain independence from India or become a part of
Pakistan does not look bright. For those just tuning into the strife in southeast Asia, it may be
assumed that this conflict was doomed to occur because of the differences in religion, yet the
history of India and Kashmir tells a different story. India and Pakistan have both used their
power to construct new identities for their people in order to pursue a political agenda. We can
view both the past and present events in Kashmir through a constructivist lens: first through the
mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims, and now through the mobilization of Indian Hindus. The
pseudo-democratic practices that India pursued against the interests of Kashmiris decades ago
have led up to this moment in history. The only difference now is India is openly rejecting their
democratic, secular ideals on an international stage.
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